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Abstract This paper uses network analysis to study how employment intermediaries
have influenced inter-firm worker mobility in a region of Italy, in response to a 1997
reform that introduced temporary employment agencies. Worker reallocations from
a matched employer-employee dataset are mapped onto a directed graph where the
vertices are firms and the links denote transfers of workers between firms. Temporary
employment agencies significantly improve network integration and practicability,
while rapidly increasing the control over mobility channels. The trade off inherent in
intermediation activity is captured and discussed. The potential of network analysis
as a tool for monitoring regional labor markets is highlighted.
Keywords Labor market intermediaries · Information brokerage · Inter-firm
networks · Matched employer-employee data
JEL Classifications D80 · J60 · R10
1 Introduction
This paper provides an empirical contribution on how to capture the effects of
employment intermediation by exploiting complex network analysis applied to
worker mobility data. Network models are operationalized in the attempt to provide
a novel understanding of two central issues of labor intermediation: (1) how and to
what extent the arrival of labor intermediaries following enactment of a reform affects
market integration and accessibility of different employers by people who reallocate
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within the market, and (2) whether and how the power of intermediaries in control-
ling and directing worker flows grows over time, and the fundamental dynamics of
this process.
These questions are derived directly from the fundamental trade-off characteriz-
ing brokerage activity, according to which, on the one side, intermediation increases
matching opportunities by reducing both parties’ information costs, and on the other
side, it produces monopolistic rents for the intermediary, due to the information
asymmetries inherent in information brokerage which also favor concentration of the
market in the hands of a few intermediaries.
To explore these issues, we apply for the first time a complex network approach
to employer-employee matched data covering the universe of private employment in
Veneto, a highly industrialized region in the North–East of Italy. A network repre-
sentation is used to organize individual mobility events over a ten-year period, and
network models are used to capture the effects of labor intermediaries on the structure
of inter-firm reallocations.
We focus on a special category of intermediaries, temporary employment agencies
(TEAs), that was introduced in Italy by the 1997 “Treu” reform of the labor market as
a response to the persistently high level of unemployment especially in the southern
regions of the country and among young people. Prior to the Treu reform, employ-
ment services were a public monopoly operated through a network of provincial
agencies, which generally were inefficient and of little help to unemployed people
(Barbieri et al. 2001). TEAs are, thus, the very first example of a private employ-
ment intermediary in contemporary Italy (detailed information about the novelties
introduced by the Treu reform are provided in Appendix I).
The main object of the analysis is a directed graph where the vertices indicate
employers, private firms or TEAs, and the links denote transfers of workers between
employers. The data track all worker reallocations involving TEAs as either origin or
destination, which captures all labor mobility involving intermediaries.
The first analytical focus is on the degree to which the network of labor mobility
works as an integrated and easily practicable system for workers reallocating from
one job to another, measured by the small-world characteristics of the network. The
impact of TEAs on the network architecture is assessed by interpreting the tendency
of the “world” of worker mobility to become smaller as a sign that the labor market
is more accessible and more pervious to reallocation flows, and vice versa.
The second main focus is on the position of TEAs in the reallocation market
or, more specifically, on their power in controlling hiring channels, as revealed by
the number of incoming links pointing to intermediaries in the labor mobility net-
work. To this purpose, the evolution of the statistical distribution of connections over
vertices is tracked, highlighting the way in which global labor flows adjust to the
presence of labor market intermediaries (LMIs). This is followed by a discussion of
the predictions of several models of network formation describing evolution of the
link distribution in the presence of information costs.
Exploratory in its nature, the approach developed in this work allows for quantita-
tive analysis of the effects of employment intermediation on the labor market system
as a whole, while also identifying the possible mechanisms governing the evolu-
tion of intermediaries’ market power. Ultimately, the paper provides a novel set of
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tools for monitoring labor market functioning and supporting policy actions aimed,
for instance, at improving the efficiency of job matching through intermediation or
formulating better regulations for intermediated markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical foundations
of economic intermediation, with a special focus on the labor market; Section 3 intro-
duces the network framework and the empirical strategy; Section 4 describes the data.
Sections 5 and 6 present the results; Section 7 discusses the empirical evidence on the
evolution of TEAs market power in the light of network formation models; Section 8
concludes.
2 Theoretical background
The conceptual foundations of labor intermediation are rooted in the existence of
market imperfections that hamper an efficient matching of demand and supply. A
major feature of real, imperfect labor markets is the difficulty encountered by both
individuals and firms to locate matches/partners and/or to negotiate successfully the
terms of matching agreements. Third parties –intermediaries – may exploit these cir-
cumstances and attempt to realize profits by selling information or ad hoc matching
services to workers and firms.
The economic literature has long recognized that information in real markets is
costly and asymmetrically distributed between prospective parties in a transaction. It
has been demonstrated that the existence of private information can have substantial
implications in terms of market functioning and deviation from perfect competition
benchmark.
Akerlof (1970) highlighted in a seminal paper the potential magnitude of mar-
ket failure under asymmetric information. When the quality of a good is uncertain
or difficult to determine for prospective buyers, there is an incentive for sell-
ers to offer goods of poor quality. Buyers who are aware of such behavior may
refrain from buying, generating a reduction in the size of the market, up to the
emergence of no-transaction equilibria, that is, the disappearance of the mar-
ket while demand and supply remain unsatisfied and resources unemployed. In
these cases, public or private institutions may come into play to solve informa-
tion asymmetries to everyone’s advantage and, in the case of private organizations,
make a profit out of such activity. Interestingly, Akerlof warned of the possi-
ble concentration of power in the hands of intermediary institutions that control
information.
Transaction cost economics, rooted in the work of Coase (1937) and Williamson
(1975), describe how incomplete and costly information result in transaction costs
that are at the foundation of decisions between markets and hierarchies. Spulber
(1996) extended the same argument to the organization of market institutions, iden-
tifying four main activities of intermediary organizations: setting prices, providing
liquidity to markets, coordinating transactions between buyers and sellers, and gen-
erating market information about the quality of goods. Dixit (2003) explored a model
of private intermediation as a mode of governance that helps enforcing contracts by
means of collecting and conveying costly information about individual behaviors. In
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all these cases, the role of intermediaries is to facilitate transactions, putting their
skills at the service of market clearing.
The central problem of information being asymmetrically distributed and costly
to obtain has been assumed in macroeconomic models of search and matching in the
labor market. Decentralized search for information has been demonstrated to gener-
ate non-market-clearing equilibria characterized by frictional unemployment. This is
because jobs and workers are heterogeneous and thus a degree of mismatch is possi-
ble between the parties on different sides of the market. While people may be willing
to accept some of the risk associated with imperfect matching, they can reduce the
risk by engaging in costly search for potential matching opportunities. The important
element here is the trade off individuals face between the option value of keeping
on searching and the increasing cost of delaying matching. In equilibrium, frictional
unemployment would be a direct consequence of search activity and represent a
departure from the market-clearing hypothesis.
Search and matching theory integrates these elements in a consistent framework
that describes the formation of new relationships between parties as a function of
workers’ search decisions and firms’ decisions about disclosures of job vacancies.
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) provided a comprehensive formalization of search
and matching in the labor market, building on previous individual work. Diamond
(1982) probably presented the first model of a search economy where traders’ expec-
tations about the level of aggregate activity determine the actual level of activity,
resulting in multiple, non-market-clearing equilibria. Again, this framework opens
up the potential for intermediaries to come into play offering market-clearing support
services.
One of the most harmful consequences of asymmetric information prior to a con-
tractual agreement is adverse selection of prospective matching counterparts. To
mitigate the effects of adverse selection in the labor market, workers and firms can
typically engage in screening (Stiglitz 1975) and signalling (Spence 1973) activities.
Screening is the activity of collecting and processing information about the qualities
or characteristics of individuals, firms and jobs. Signalling is the activity of reporting
own characteristics to prospective counterparts in a credible way. Both such activ-
ities are costly and require specialized skills, thus offering the possibility for third
parties to specialize in these activities and perform them on behalf of clients. This is
precisely one of the roles of intermediaries in the labor market, or LMIs.
Workers bear the direct costs of exploring the employers’ side of the market,
applying for jobs and attending interviews, as well as the indirect costs of lost work-
ing or leisure time. Employers bear the direct costs of advertising vacancies and
screening applicants, and the indirect costs of reduced output until a vacancy is filled.
LMIs reduce search costs for both parties by collecting information on players on
one side of the market and then selling it to the players on the other side, at a price
that is lower than the cost to the buyers of searching on their own.
Workers may hide or distort some of the information provided in their CVs or
credentials, in order to make them more attractive to potential employers. Similarly,
firms might exploit asymmetric information to the detriment of workers, for instance,
by under-promoting deserving workers in order to save on wages (Garcia-Pe´rez and
Mun˜oz-Bullo´n 2005), or by misrepresenting job conditions in order to attract workers
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(Lee 2009). LMIs can mitigate the problem of adverse selection due to asymmetric
information by performing accurate screening of both job seekers and employers, and
assuming direct responsibility for selection through special contractual provisions.
The literature highlights an additional aspect of information asymmetry that is
specific to intermediation activity, namely, the asymmetry between the LMI and its
clients. LMIs, which are in the business of selling information, are inherently better
informed about the information they sell than are their customers. The informa-
tional advantage of LMIs over participants in a labor market transaction represents
a potentially strong incentive for the intermediary to use its information to extract
rents from its service. The analyses in Lee (2009) and Kleiner and Todd (2009) pro-
vide examples of how intermediaries can use their advantage to the detriment of
customers.
The potentially harmful consequences of this sort of informational asymmetry
anticipated by Akerlof (1970) highlight the compelling trade off in any information
brokerage/concentration process, between the benefits of increased accessibility to
information, in our case, represented by the availability of huge chunks of informa-
tion at low prices, and the costs in the form of the monopolistic and/or monopsonistic
position of the mass information provider. In our cases, these costs are translated into
the non-competitive mark ups charged by LMIs for their intermediation services, or
the promotion of high mark-up matches, rather than matches that would be optimal
for the parties.
In markets with imperfect information, the amount of information available to the
parties through a broker depends positively on the broker’s access to information
through its clientele, hence on its actual market share. A self-reinforcing incentive
mechanism is therefore at play, according to which the bigger the broker the larger
the number of people who will be tempted to use its services, which further increases
the broker’s influence in the market. The informational advantage of the intermediary
over its clients and the resulting monopolistic/monopsonistic behavior also increase
with market share, up to the point where they may neutralize the benefits of infor-
mation brokerage and produce net damages and the market reaches a level of major
concentration.
According to standard arguments related to the effects of competition, rivalry
between private LMIs, and/or between private LMIs and public employment agen-
cies, can favor workers and firms by keeping the price of intermediation services low
(competitive) and preventing the emergence of dominant positions, while guarantee-
ing quality matching. In this respect, the role of policy makers in market design and
regulation is of fundamental importance in order to have intermediated labor markets
that encourage innovation and performance through mechanisms of labor realloca-
tion (Kılıc¸aslan and Taymaz 2008); in turn, economic research should feed policy
decisions with new evidence and thorough explanation of the evolutionary dynamics
of labor markets.
The present paper focuses on a particular category of LMIs, namely tempo-
rary employment agencies. People apply to TEAs to access short-term employment
opportunities through negligible investment in job search, and as an entry stage to
more long-term positions (Autor 2001; Autor and Houseman 2002). Firms rely on
TEAs in order to reduce the fixed costs of searching for temporary workers, and they
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also often outsource to TEAs the recruitment of critical worker categories or even
whole workforces. In the latter case, workers seeking employment in these firms are
forced to work through TEAs (Houseman 2001; Ichino et al. 2005).
Garcia-Perez and Mun˜oz-Bullo´n (2005: 1) advance a strong argument that TEAs
‘in fact offer a unique screening device that matches the individual with the most
appropriate skill-level to the job in question’. Using TEAs in order to screen their
workers and offering permanent positions to the most suitable ones is becoming
a common strategy for firms. Autor (2001) shows that, in several sectors of the
US economy, TEA services represent the most important channel for recruiting
permanent workers.
In Italy, in the period analyzed in this study, TEAs were the only intermediaries in
the market; therefore, using TEAs is a unique means available to firms and workers
to access search and screening services. This context extends the scope of TEAs to
the whole range of typical LMI functions and provides an ideal setting within which
to appreciate the effect of intermediaries on labor market flows.
3 Network setup and empirical strategy
Analysis of labor mobility at the individual level using network concepts dates back
to the seminal work of Granovetter (1973), which illustrates the importance of differ-
ent types of social connections for successful job search. Since then, joint research
on labor mobility and network analysis has attracted attention from scholars in
economics and economic geography on aspects related to innovation mechanisms,
knowledge spillovers and the spatial diffusion of economic activities.1
The properties and structure of the global architecture of firm to firm labor flows,
their evolution and determinants remain today largely unexplored and unknown.2
At the firm level, worker reallocation appears to be a gradual process that can be
likened to percolation through a porous material, the microscopic architecture of
which ultimately determines the direction and timing of flows usually observed at
some higher level of aggregation. This study assumes a network representation of
inter-firm worker mobility – where the vertices are firms and the links are worker
1 The phenomenon of knowledge spillovers enabled by worker mobility between organizations is
addressed in Almeida and Kogut (1999), Owen-Smith and Powell (2004), Audretsch and Keilbach (2005)
among other works. Insightful analyses of the role of worker mobility in sustaining firm dynamics and
cluster formation are provided by Fallick et al. (2006), who discuss the relationship between innova-
tion performance and mobility of skilled personnel in the Silicon Valley cluster, and Casper (2007),
who focuses on the mobility of managers as a cohesive force in the San Diego biotechnology cluster.
Agrawal et al. (2006) highlight the role of interpersonal relationships or social embeddedness in sustaining
knowledge flows beyond workers’ physical mobility, and some more recent studies address the territorial
localization of spillovers due to worker mobility (Breschi and Lissoni 2009), also making use of matched
employer-employee data (Eriksson and Lindgren 2009; Boschma et al. 2009). Comprehensive reviews of
network analysis and its application in many fields of science can be found in Albert and Baraba´si (2002)
and Newman (2003).
2 A first attempt of describing firm-to-firm worker mobility using complex networks can be found in
Gianelle (2012).
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flows occurring in the space of one year – which is used to support an original inves-
tigation of the role of labor intermediaries in shaping the web of inter-firm worker
flows. The precise graph-theoretic definitions used in the paper are provided in
Appendix II.
The extent to which one type of vertex with the function of intermediary (TEA)
affects the degree of integration and practicability of the web of inter-firm flows
is the first focus. The goal is to see whether and how TEAs contribute to linking
different parts of the labor market in a robust and reliable way, while shortening the
network distance between firms and making the reallocation market potentially more
accessible for mobile workers.
Network theory relates the notion of integration and practicability directly to a
specific network model known as the “small world” (Watts and Strogatz 1998; New-
man 2000; Goyal et al. 2006), the functional significance of which is precisely that
vertices are easily reachable from one to another via a minimum assembly of links.
The small-world model has been shown to be highly efficient for enabling reliable
communication and flows between vertices (Latora and Marchiori 2001).
We use measurable small-world properties of the inter-firm network as indicators
of the effects of TEA on labor market integration and permeability to realloca-
tion flows: the closer the network to a small world model, the more integrated and
permeable the system will be to reallocation flows.
A network is said to be a small world if the following four conditions simultane-
ously apply:
(i) A large number of vertices are reachable from/can reach many other vertices
in the network, that is, there are uninterrupted sequences of links connecting a
relevant fraction of possible pairs of vertices.
(i) Vertices are reachable with little effort, that is, interconnected vertices on
average are just a few steps/links apart (going along a link is assumed to be
costly).
(iii) The system is parsimonious overall, that is, the actual number of links is much
smaller than the maximum possible if there is a link between every possible
pair of vertices (and providing additional links is assumed to be costly).
(iv) Vertices form cohesive groups, that is, vertex neighbors or vertices directly
connected to the given one tend also to be interconnected with each other,
resulting in alternative ways of reaching a former neighbor vertex should the
direct connection be lost.
Reframing these conditions in economic terms, we can consider a network to be
a small world when, whichever vertex is considered, the number of vertices poten-
tially reachable is high (condition 1), the cost of actually reaching these vertices, on
average, is low (conditions 2 and 3), and the system is robust to local disconnections
(condition 4). In real world situations, there is often a positive relationship between
the actual number and variety of alternatives for moves or choices, and the average
cost of exploiting these opportunities for achieving targets. The small world has been
shown to be an extremely effective configuration in the context of problematic rela-
tionships of this kind because it guarantees maximum reachability while minimizing
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the costs to both the system designer (i.e. the cost of providing links) and the sys-
tem user (i.e. the cost of moving through sequences of links in order to reach a given
target).3
For workers reallocating between firms, the cost of linking is given by several
components, for instance, the cost of performing direct job search or the price paid
to an intermediary in order to screen the market and identify suitable vacancies, the
loss of salary during possible periods of inactivity between subsequent job spells, the
cost of adapting to a new job environment or the effort of learning new tasks and
procedures, or the short-term cost of lower wages in the new job, because information
about the real value of the match, and hence of the worker, is not completely disclosed
to the employer at the very beginning of the employment relationship.
The costly move of a worker from one firm to another is not neutral with respect
to other workers employed in the origin or destination firms. The reallocation of an
individual from firm A to firm B links the social network of employees of company
A to the social network of employees of company B. As demonstrated in Granovetter
(1974) and more recently in Cingano and Rosolia (2012), this is likely to produce
positive externalities for other employees in A, because personal relationships act as
preferential channels for transmitting information about employment opportunities
in B and mitigate the asymmetric information problem associated with job changes,
possibly leading to other employees from firm A to later follow the same reallocation
path, should firm B be recognized as a good employer. A small-world network is
therefore parsimonious with respect to reallocation costs, for so long as workers move
along established paths they bear lower costs.
A small-world network appears to be an integrated system dominated by local
clustering, with a relatively small number of long-range links acting as shortcuts
between different clusters of vertices that otherwise would be much farther from one
another. A giant strongly connected component guarantees the existence of connect-
ing paths between all possible vertices within its boundaries, while short distance
indicates that vertices can be reached with little effort. Clustering or redundancy of
local level links promotes robustness to disconnection and reliable connectivity based
on multiple independent pathways (White and Houseman 2002).
The four defining properties of the small-world model can be formulated, for a
directed network, in exact graph-theoretical terms, to obtain the four propositions pre-
sented in Table 1, column 2; the evaluation rules in Table 1, column 3, identify a range
of network parameter values within which a network exhibits small-world character-
istics (Watts 1999; Newman 2003). Based on these rules, Section 5 describes how far
the empirical labor mobility network resembles a small world, and how TEAs push
the network architecture farther from or closer to a small world.
The second research question is how TEAs affect the distribution of labor flows,
namely, whether and how reallocation flows crowd into TEAs resulting in apprecia-
ble concentration of the market in the hands of intermediaries. In the labor mobility
3 The efficiency of small-world networks has been studied empirically with reference mostly to transport
networks, such as railway systems (for instance, Latora and Marchiori 2002), or airport connections (for
instance, Li and Cai 2004).
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network, this can be addressed by considering the degree centrality, i.e. the number
of incident links, of TEA vertices and comparing this indicator across firms and time.
In networked systems, the presence of pivotal actors with high degree centrality,
called hubs, is signalled by a right-skewed degree distribution, with a long or fat tail
that contains vertices with many more connections than average and which appear
more frequently than in a standard Gaussian distribution. The literature on complex
networks shows that the tail of the degree distribution of a network with hubs can
often be approximated by a Pareto distribution or a negative power law (Baraba´si and
Albert 1999; Albert and Baraba´si 2002; Newman 2003).
Building on this ground, in the present study we verify whether TEAs form a hub
tail, searching for Paretian behaviors in the in-degree distribution of labor flows and
using the power law as a benchmark for evaluation. This is accomplished in two steps.
First, we calculate the total-degree distribution of the network, i.e. the distribution of
both incoming and outgoing links, and we determine the TEAs ranking within the
distribution. Second, we focus on hiring channels, as given by the in-degree of the
network vertices, or the number of incoming labor flows, representing the capacity
of firms to attract applicant workers from other source firms in the network. The in-
degree provides a measure of firm shares of new hires, and therefore the evolution of
TEAs market power can be appreciated by determining the TEAs position within the
in-degree distribution while assessing how the distribution overall evolves over time
before and after TEAs arrival.
4 Data
The empirical investigation is based upon the Veneto Worker History panel (VWH),
a matched employer-employee dataset derived from the Italian Social Security Insti-
tute (Inps) administrative records and covering the entire population of workers and
employers in Veneto in the period 1991–2001.4
Veneto is a dynamic regional economy centered on manufacturing. The industrial
system is represented by a large population of small and medium sized firms, often
organized in industrial districts, the specializations of which are garment manufac-
ture, textiles, leather and shoes, goldsmithing, mechanical products, furniture, and
plastics. The average firm size in 2001 was three employees for the whole economy
and nine for manufacturing, according to census data from Istat.
In the late 1980s and the second half of the 1990s, the Veneto labor market was
characterized by a positive rate of job creation in almost every economic sector and
decreasing unemployment to almost frictional levels.5 The employment stock in the
private sector was 968,149 in 1991 and 1,120,278 in 2001, according to census data.
4 On the Inps dataset used in the present paper, see Tattara and Volpe (2001); Tattara and Valentini (2010);
Gianelle (2012).
5 According to Istat data, the unemployment rate increased from around 5 % at the beginning of the 1990s
to 7.5 % in 1994, immediately after the economic downturn of 1992–1993; then it decreased progressively
to 4.5 % in 2001.
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The manufacturing sector represented 55.7 % and 50.7 % of total private sector
employment in 1991 and 2001, respectively.
The VWH data cover all individual workers employed in the private sector, and
every establishment with at least one employee. The available information allows to
build a monthly history of the working lives of all employees hired for at least one day
during the period of observation by firms based in Veneto, including TEAs. VWH
covers only employment spells, while no direct observations are available for tran-
sitions to/from unemployment status. Individual inactivity between job spells cannot
be distinguished between unemployment and exit from the labor force on the basis
of the registered information.
The labor mobility network is obtained by counting the individual hires occur-
ring within a 12-month window that give rise to reallocations, where a reallocation is
defined as a pair of events constituted by a separation (i.e. conclusion of a job rela-
tionship with a given employer) and a subsequent engagement of the same individual
in a job relationship with another employer. Reallocations are mapped onto a binary
directed graph the vertices of which are firms and TEAs, and the links between them
the flows of workers between firms or between TEAs and firms.
The structure of provisional contracts is triangular; TEAs are formal employers
of temporary workers. We do not know which client firms the temporary employees
work for when contracted through a TEA, but we can track all reallocations the ori-
gins or destinations of which are a TEA. Most important, it is possible to track the
network of mobility episodes related to people – especially young people – who enter
the labor market via a TEA, and subsequently become direct employees of a private
firm.
Eleven networks are constructed for the period 1991–2001; the analytical focus is
restricted to reallocations of workers, of either sex, aged between 15 and 65 years,
whose engagement occurred between 1st January and 31st December each year, and
where the time between the separation and subsequent engagement did not exceed six
months.6 Reallocations are tracked cutting across the administrative boundaries of
Veneto, meaning that firms located outside the region can enter the network sample
if they transfer/receive workers to/from firms located in Veneto. No restrictions are
made for job spell duration or type of occupation; reallocations to the same firm are
excluded.
Table 2 reports the total number of individual reallocations occurred in the period
1997–2001 originating from TEA and non-TEA firms, by worker and firm charac-
teristics. In the five-years period, an average of 171,000 individual reallocations per
year are reported. TEAs constitute the destination of 34,215 reallocations and the ori-
gin of 40,088 reallocations; 7.1 % of total reallocations registered in the Veneto labor
market in the 1997–2001 period has TEAs either as origin or destination, increasing
from just 1 % in 1998 to more than 14 % in 2001.
6 Since long periods of apparent inactivity might be hiding voluntary exits from the labor force, we made
the relatively conservative choice of excluding from the analysis people who remain inactive for more than
six consecutive months.
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Table 2 Reallocations originating from TEA and non-TEA firms, by worker and firm characteristics
Variable Categories Non-TEA (column %) TEA (column %)
Gender: Female 376,806 (37.5) 14,344 (35.8)
Male 629,067 (62.5) 25,744 (64.2)
Age: 15–24 287,100 (28.6) 11,706 (29.2)
25–34 422,558 (42.0) 19,443 (48.5)
35–49 246,454 (24.5) 8,114 (20.2)
50–65 49,761 (4.9) 825 (2.1)
Firm size: 0–9 333,064 (33.1) 7,837 (19.6)
10–19 157,617 (15.7) 5,098 (12.7)
20–49 164,851 (16.4) 7,076 (17.7)
50–249 189,346 (18.8) 10,476 (26.1)
≥ 250 160,995 (16.0) 9,601 (23.9)
Sector: Manufacturing 446,396 (44.4) 22,420 (55.8)
Construction 64,757 (6.4) 661 (1.7)
Transport 69,050 (6.9) 2,028 (5.1)
Trade 144,435 (14.3) 5,225 (13.0)
Hotel trades 88,612 (8.8) 1,822 (4.6)
Professional and financial services 127,377 (12.7) 6,634 (16.5)
Education, social, health services 56,084 (5.6) 1,182 (3.0)
Others 9,162 (0.9) 116 (0.3)
TEA and non-TEA flows are substantially aligned in terms of gender composition,
with only a slightly higher percentage of men in TEAs. Intermediated employment
flows are on average younger than non-TEA ones, with the age group 25–34 over-
represented by 6.5 percentage points, and the age group 35–49 underrepresented
by 4.3 points. TEA reallocations are directed towards larger firms, especially those
sized 50 and above that represent one of the more dynamic components of the Ital-
ian manufacturing system (Caprio 2002). Finally, TEA flows target manufacturing
and professional services comparatively more than non-TEA flows, and less than the
construction and hotel trades.
5 Results I: Network integration and practicability
For each year network, the following indicators are calculated: number of ver-
tices and links, density, size of the WCC and SCC, APL, and ACC. The structural
properties of the actual networks for the 1997–2001 period are compared to the
corresponding properties of two series of randomized networks taken as null models:
• Null model (1): all TEA vertices and incident links are removed from the actual
network to obtain a new network with the same architecture, but no TEA vertices
and no reallocation flows involving TEAs.
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• Null model (2): for each TEA vertex j in the actual network, the non-TEA vertex
i is removed which satisfies ki =min(k) subject to the condition k ≥ kj , where k
is the total-degree; in this way a network is obtained that excludes the non-TEA
firms most equivalent to TEAs in terms of number of connections.
The difference between the actual networks and null model (1) provides an esti-
mate of the impact of the TEAs conditional on TEA mobility (i.e. labor mobility
involving TEAs as the origin or destination) having no substitute in the labor market;
this yields an upper bound to the real TEA effect. The difference between the actual
network and null model (2) provides an estimate of the mobility effect of those firms
that are most similar to TEAs in terms of the number of labor flows involved. On the
assumption that this effect can proxy for the substitution of TEA mobility by other
non-TEA firms, the difference between null model (1) and null model (2) provides
a more reliable approximation of the TEA effect. In practice, if TEAs play a sub-
stantial role in shaping the network architecture, null model (1) will exhibit different
structural properties from the actual network, and null model (2) will be more similar
to the actual network.
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of network size. The system exhibits a minimum
extension in 1993, with 67,578 vertices and 86,602 links, and a maximum extension
in 2001, with 104,439 vertices and 207,504 links. Link density is always very low at
around 2.0e-05, with a minimum of 1.84e-05 in 1992, and a maximum of 2.23e-05
in 1995. Over the whole period considered, the network is extremely sparse, which
complies with the small-world model.
Time series of labor mobility networks of the type considered in the present anal-
yses are affected by the business cycle, since worker turnover tends to be markedly
pro-cyclical, and job-to-job mobility constitutes the most dynamic component of this
trend.7 The business cycle thus affects the size and the density of the reallocation net-
work; when the level of economic activity is low – as was the case in Italy during the
1992-93 recession – the network appears comparatively much sparser and less inter-
connected than in high performing business cycle periods (as occurred in 1994-95 in
Veneto).
In Fig. 1, the number of links exhibit a clear pro-cyclical pattern during the
period 1991-1997. There is a pronounced downward spike corresponding to the
1992-93 recession (−25 % links), followed by rapid growth in 1994-95 (+47 %
links), as the economy recovered due to a Lira devaluation that boosted export com-
petitiveness which, in turn, especially favored the largely export-oriented economy
of Veneto. After 1997, the impact of the business cycle is less clear: across the
whole period 1997-2001, in the presence of moderate economic growth, the network
exhibits an intense, sustained increase in the number of vertices and links (respec-
tively +29 % and +49 %), with a slight slowdown in 2001 corresponding to the
downturn induced by the burst of the new-economy bubble and increasing uncertainty
about the international geopolitical scenario.
7 For the US labor market, see e.g. Davis et al. (1996) and Fallick and Fleischman (2004). For the Italian
labor market, see Tattara and Valentini (2010) and Leombruni and Quaranta (2005).
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Fig. 1 Vertices and links
Comparing the actual trend with null model (1), it can be seen that TEA links
contribute significantly to explaining the observed growth in connections, increasing
the null model base by 1 % in 1998, 5 % in 1999, 10 % in 2000, and 14 % in 2001.
Notably, null model (1) exhibits a reduction in the number of links in 2001 compared
to 2000 so that, in the last year of observation, the activity of labor market intermedi-
aries appears to be the sole driver of the increase in the actual number of reallocation
channels between firms. Null model (2) has 8 % more links in 2001 than null model
(1); this figure represents our prudent estimate of the impact of TEA at the end of the
period of observation, which reveals that the 1997 reform, through the establishment
of private intermediaries, was able effectively to unlock new mobility opportunities.
Figure 2 shows the extent of the largest strongly/weakly connected components
in terms of the percentage of vertices covered, allowing a first inspection of network
interconnection or integration. A pro-cyclical pattern is clearly identifiable. The SCC
shows a minimum in 1993 at 13 % and a maximum in 2000 at 30 %; for the WCC
the figures are 77 % and 90 %, respectively. Starting in 1995, the SCC remains above
25 %, and the WCC remains above 85 %; in the same period, the second largest
strongly connected component never covers more than six vertices, while the second
largest weakly connected component has just 14 vertices. So, from 1995, the system
exhibits the inter-connectivity structure distinctive of a small world.
In 1997, the giant components embark on a steady growth path leading to a cumu-
lative increase of 13 % for the SCC, and 4 % for the WCC for the period 1997–2001.
In 2001, the SCC of null model (2) essentially superimposes the actual SCC, and
both are 6 % larger than the null model (1) SCC, revealing that mutual connectiv-
ity appears to be positively affected by TEAs, but insensitive to the exclusion of
non-TEA firms. TEAs seem to favor integration of the system.
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Fig. 2 SCC (left axis) and WCC (right axis), % coverage of the entire network
Figure 3 shows the APL and ACC; the first (left axis) is expressed by the num-
ber of links between vertices, the second (right axis) is an index number that varies
between 0 (no clustering) and 1 (complete clustering). Across the whole period, the
ACC of the actual network is at least one order of magnitude higher than the ACC of
a comparable network with the same joint distribution of in-degree and out-degree,
but with links positioned randomly. This clustering pattern is typical of a small world
Fig. 3 APL (left axis) and ACC (right axis)
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network. Up to 1998, the ACC fluctuates between 0.007 and 0.010, with a very slight
tendency to increase over time; from 1999 to 2001, it shows a phase of intense growth
to reach 0.015 by the end of the period, 57 % higher than the 1997 level.
The ACC of null model (1) remains substantially flat, at the pre-reform level;
the ACC of null model (2) closely follows the actual path. In 2001, the actual ACC
is 63 % higher than the null model (1) ACC, while the ACC of null model (2)
is 46 % above null model (1), pointing to a strong, positive effect of TEAs on
clustering.
The APL reaches a maximum in 1993 of 8.5, and a minimum in 2001 of 5, and
across the whole period it is strictly lower than the APL of a random network of
equivalent size, which fits the requirements for a small world network. After the 1997
reform, mutually interconnected vertices are much closer to each other: between 1997
and 2001, the average distance reduces by 24 %.
The APL of null model (1) exhibits an almost flat behavior, while the APL of null
model (2) is just one percentage point above the actual APL. In 2001, the actual APL
is 20 % less than the null model (1) APL which indicates that TEAs provide effective
shortcuts within the network by substantially reducing the distances between firms.
Comparing the null model (1) in Figs. 1 and 3, it can be seen that the number of
links increases over time, but this expansion is not accompanied by an appreciable
change in the link arrangement, as revealed by the ACC and the APL. On the con-
trary, the increase in network size due to labor intermediation modifies the network
structure in the direction of higher cohesion and lower distances.
The results of the analysis suggest that TEAs act to make the small-world network
of labor mobility significantly smaller and, therefore, more integrated and more per-
meable to reallocation flows, through the establishment of shortcut paths that span
the economy, interweaving distant vertices into more cohesive communities, and
reducing average distances.
6 Results II: Distribution of labor flows
The total-degree distributions for each year network are derived and some descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 3, including: average degree (kG), median degree
(k50), degree of the 99th percentile (k99), and maximum degree (kmax).
The total-degree sequences exhibit a broad range of values that tends to increase
over time. Despite the relatively high maxima (315 in 1992, increasing to 6,524 in
2001), the average degree is always very low, ranging from 2.6 in 1993 to 4 in 2000
and 2001. This is due to the extreme concentration of the distribution around the
minimum degree, revealed by the median values which are 1 up to 1994, and 2 there-
after. Two features are striking: the degree value of the largest fraction of vertices
is smaller than the average, with the majority of vertices having just the minimum
degree; a small fraction of vertices has a degree value that is many times larger than
the average, e.g. the scores for the 99th percentile are six to nine times larger than
average.
Across the whole period, the total-degree distribution exhibits a markedly right-
skewed pattern, with a heavy or fat tail. This applies also if we consider in-degree and
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Table 3 Total-degree distributions: main descriptive statistics
year n kG k50 k99 kmax
1991 80,680 3.1 1 23 429
1992 78,300 2.9 1 21 315
1993 67,578 2.6 1 17 507
1994 69,816 3.0 1 22 527
1995 78,450 3.5 2 28 467
1996 78,966 3.4 2 27 358
1997 80,820 3.4 2 29 480
1998 84,823 3.6 2 30 731
1999 91,136 3.8 2 32 2,100
2000 100,671 4.0 2 35 4,635
2001 104,439 4.0 2 33 6,524
out-degree distributions separately. Therefore, network architecture of labor mobility
appears to be dominated by a few vertices, referred to as hubs, which have many more
connections than average. Moreover, the maximum degrees increase steeply just after
1997, with average annual growth of around 100 %, suggesting that the 1997 reform
favored the formation of large hubs.
Table 4 reports the overall ranking based on total degree, of the ten biggest TEAs,
labelled a to k. In 1997, only two TEAs were operating with very limited activ-
ity, as revealed by their low ranking. By 1998, one TEA was at the extreme tail
of the connectivity distribution, and ranked 4th overall; four TEAs were positioned
within the first hundred positions, and all the first ten ranked TEAs were within
the 99th percentile of the distribution. In 1999, TEAs dominated the degree distribu-
tion, with four intermediaries in the first four positions. Soon after their appearance
in the system, TEAs showed high levels of attractiveness and a strong capacity to
redirect labor flows, and quickly became the most important hubs in the mobility
network.
Following the 1997 labor market reform, the system became progressively more
dependent on TEAs, and on a few in particular. This situation is critical because
collapse or malfunction of even a small number of TEA hubs could compromise
connectivity (Albert et al. 2000); policy makers might be concerned about grow-
ing monopolistic/monopsonistic power of a few TEAs in the labor reallocation
market.
The distribution of hiring channels, the in-degree distribution, is of particular
relevance for capturing the evolution of TEA market power. Figure 4 shows the
complementary cumulative in-degree distributions (CCDD), plotted on a double log-
arithmic scale, together with the corresponding power-law fits. Power law-like degree
distributions have been extensively investigated in network analysis and are widely
acknowledged to represent a benchmark model for many real-world phenomena
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Table 4 Ranking of the ten biggest TEA according to total-degree
TEAs ranking (1=highest total-degree)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
a 162 4 1 1 1
b 162 16 2 2 2
c – 37 3 3 3
d – 56 4 4 4
e – 103 7 6 6
f – 135 22 8 7
g – 137 27 10 9
h – 138 30 13 11
i – 150 36 22 13
k – 156 55 23 14
Total n. of positions 163 189 204 215 220
(Baraba´si and Albert 1999; Newman 2005). Most relevant for the present study,
power-law models support the existence of hubs.
Each year plot in Fig. 4 follows a negative and almost linear trend; at the extreme
tail of the distribution, a downward departure from the power-law fit is evident for
the years 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, but is less pronounced for 1993
and 1994. In 1999, the empirical data almost exactly overlap the power-law fit, while
in 2000 and 2001, the distribution tail drifts progressively upwards, concentrating
greater weight than predicted by a pure power law.
Visual inspection of the plots suggests several things. First, a necessary condi-
tion for data to be power-law distributed is that they align along a straight line,
on a double logarithmic plot; the empirical distributions would seem to match this
condition. Second, the rapid decay of the tail or the truncation observed up to the
year 1998 means that extreme, massive events are less likely in reality than pre-
dicted by pure power law. Third, after 1998 and coincident with the materialization
of TEA effects on the connectivity structure, the in-degree distribution shows a tran-
sition from an upper truncated to a much more unequal pattern with a much heavier
tail.
In 1999, 2000, and 2001 the four biggest hubs are TEAs, and several other TEAs
occupy the extreme percentiles of the degree distribution, concentrating shares of
hiring channels which increase constantly over time, and being ultimately responsible
for the transitions observed in the distribution tail. Intermediaries produce a sharp
polarization of the degree distribution which consistently deviates from both a pure
and a truncated power law distribution.
This evidence is explored more deeply by statistically comparing the empirical
distributions with pure power-law models, and with power law with exponential cut
off that allows for tail decay. The general form of a power-law distribution for the
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Fig. 4 In-degree distributions and power-law fits
quantity k is p(k) = ck−α for k > kmin, c being a constant of proportionality; the
general form of a power-law distribution with exponential cut off is p(k) = ck−αeβk .
Following the procedure developed in Clauset et al. (2009):
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Fig. 4 (continued)
• We fit the complementary cumulative in-degree distribution using maximum
likelihood, simultaneously estimating the scaling parameter, α, and the minimum
threshold above which power law behavior holds, kmin.
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Table 5 Distribution fit
Power-law fits Comparison with
power law with cutoff
year a kmin p-value LR test p-value
1991 2.752 5 0.520 −2.354 0.030
1992 2.822 5 0.000 −0.552 0.293
1993 2.827 4 0.060 −0.262 0.469
1994 2.857 12 0.780 −0.268 0.464
1995 2.630 5 0.000 −11.176 0.000
1996 2.787 10 0.140 −2.749 0.019
1997 2.595 5 0.080 −7.779 0.000
1998 2.609 6 0.500 −4.958 0.002
1999 2.554 6 0.540 −1.604 0.073
2000 2.556 8 0.560 −0.065 0.716
2001 2.576 7 0.880 0.000 1.000
• We evaluate the goodness of the power-law fit by calculating an appropriate p-
value.
• We conduct a likelihood-ratio test to contrast the pure power law with a power
law with exponential cut off.8
Table 5 presents the key parameters of the fitted power laws and the p-values of
the related goodness-of-fit tests; the likelihood-ratio tests comparing the pure power
law and a power law with exponential cut off, and the related p-values, are reported
in the last two columns.9 With the exception of 1992 and 1995, in all years the power-
law model provides good fits, with excellent performance in 1991, 1994, and in the
period 1998-2001; in 1993, 1996 and 1997 there is only moderate evidence in support
of the model, but, overall, the power law performs quite well, which means it is a
reasonable theoretical benchmark for the data.
For 1991, 1996, 1997 and 1998 the power law with exponential cut off is strictly
preferred to a pure power law, but for 1999, 2000, and especially 2001, the models
are not statistically different based on the likelihood-ratio test. However, the plots
8Power law and power law with exponential cut off are nested distributions; as Clauset et al. (2009) point
out, it is always the case that the larger family of distributions, the power law with exponential cut off,
provides at least as good a fit as the smaller family, since every member of the smaller family is also
member of the larger one. The p-value associated with the likelihood-ratio test is meant to indicate whether
the fit improvement of the pure power law over a power law with cut off is substantial or not.
9 In the goodness of fit test for a pure power law, p-values are used to rule out the pure power-law
hypothesis. Therefore, if the pure power law is to be a plausible model, p-values must be high, and vice
versa. We make the standard choice of rejecting the pure power law for p-values less than 0.05. Whereas
in the likelihood-ratio test, a small p-value and a positive (negative) likelihood ratio indicate that the pure
power law wins (loses) over the alternative, when the p-value is sufficiently high (> 0.05), the test does
not favor one model over the other.
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in Fig. 4 show that, in the last three years of observation, the pure power law is
unquestionably favored over the cut-off version.
Overall, the analyses reveal the following: up to 1998, the data are well fitted to
a power law with upper truncation; in 1999, as TEAs reach the tail of the distribu-
tion, pure power-law sets in; in 2000–2001 the tail of the distribution, led by the
biggest TEAs, drifts upward away from power law prediction and pushes the system
towards an increasingly polarized configuration in which a few of the biggest TEA
hubs control major hiring channel shares.
7 Discussion on the evolution of TEA market power
Consideration of the functional shape of the degree distribution, rather than just the
number of links incident to the TEAs, helps us to understand how the system adjusts
to the presence of TEAs and allows us to relate observed behaviors to the vast liter-
ature on models of network formation, which should increase understanding of the
dynamics of intermediation activity.
Several network formation models have been proposed, which can produce degree
distributions with similar functional forms to those observed in the labor mobility
network, and account for transition paths comparable to the one triggered by the
arrival of intermediaries. There are two classes of models that build on an informa-
tion cost argument and provide insights for understanding the possible dynamics of
intermediation in the labor reallocation market.
In the literature on complex networks, right-skewed degree distributions with
heavy tails are usually associated with link formation mechanisms based on pref-
erential attachment rules, where the probability that one vertex connects to another
is assumed proportional to the degree of the recipient vertex (Baraba´si and Albert
1999). Based on this simple framework, scholars have built models that account for
upper truncation to power-law behavior, by introducing constraints on the attachment
mechanism that limit the addition of new vertex links. Varying the intensity or bind-
ingness of constraints provides a range of distributions with more or less pronounced
cut offs, where the pure power law is a special case, and extremely concentrated
distributions are obtained when attachment constraints are sufficiently weak.
In Mossa et al. (2000), the constraint on link formation is modelled explicitly as an
information cost. Agents/vertices are assumed to bear some costs for gathering and
analyzing information about the other vertices. This assumption is especially realistic
if the system is large, because it is unlikely that agents know in advance the state
of the entire network. The decision about which vertex to connect to is most likely
taken based only on the information about a subset – a fraction or a fixed number
– of possible vertices; within such a subset, some form of preferential attachment
then comes into play. The link distribution resulting from these rules is a power law
with an upper exponential cut off the strength of which depends on the incidence of
information costs.
Other studies propose a network formation paradigm in which preferential attach-
ment is not assumed, but arises naturally from the simultaneous optimization of
multiple competing objectives. This approach is of particular interest from an eco-
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nomic perspective because it explicitly models the trade off between the typical costs
and benefits for agents making decisions in a context of scarce resources, which is
characteristic of job search problems.
The fundamentals of this sort of model are described and discussed in Fabrikant
et al. (2002) and developed further in D’Souza et al. (2007). Agents/vertices are
randomly arranged in a given space; they are assumed to benefit from linking with
vertices that are centrally located in the system, that is, high degree vertices, but carry
attachment costs that are proportional to the Euclidean distance between the current
and target location. Linking decisions will then involve targets that are both close to
the actual position in the space and centrally located in the network.
In other words, networking activity tries to optimize on a trade off between the
search and attachment costs represented by distance, and the benefits or option values
represented by network centrality. As search costs fall relative to centrality bene-
fits, the resulting degree distribution will shift from a power law with cut off to a
pure power law and even beyond, ultimately resulting in a winner-take-all distribu-
tion, corresponding to a star configuration network in which one vertex receives all
incoming connections.
The behavior of these trade-off models can be likened to the introduction of inter-
mediation in a system in which link formation is subject to information costs. Also,
the empirical evidence provided in Section 6 would seem to match the theoretical
predictions (taking account of the models’ abstractness). In the real world, intermedi-
aries exactly concentrate information and provide low-cost shortcuts to employment
opportunities. Their value as gateways to future employment makes them attractive
for workers.
In the Veneto mobility network, a few years after their entry, a small group of
TEAs overtakes the power law distribution of labor flows, triggering an evident polar-
ization of the system, which likely will deepen over time. This tendency, identified
and evidenced through the network approach in this study, is extremely relevant for
policy. The theory hints that the polarization process is self sustaining and eventu-
ally will produce strong concentration of the market in a few TEAs. The presence of
intermediaries will likely increase the systemic risks inherent in the labor reallocation
system and result in eventual monopolistic/monopsonistic power.
8 Conclusions
This paper investigated the role of labor market intermediaries in shaping the inter-
firm network of worker mobility in a highly industrialized regional economy. The
proposed methodology attempts to assess and quantify in an original way the
effects that constitute the major trade-off in intermediation activity. We show that
TEAs significantly enhance integration and perviousness of the reallocation mar-
ket, while leading to a process of market concentration which is identifiable at
an early stage and the determinants of which are embedded in the activity of
intermediation.
In relation to the dynamics involved, on the one side, TEAs are very effective
at fostering labor market inter-connection; on the other side, the largest TEA firms
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threat to corner the labor market, exacerbating the effects of information asymmetries
which have a negative impact on their clients.
In future research, it would be desirable to produce causal evidence of the effects
of TEAs on the probability to transit from unemployment to employment. However,
to assess how much of the unemployment reduction observed in Veneto in 1997-
2001 is due to the introduction of TEAs goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
This work is a first and exploratory attempt of showing how network analysis can be
used as tool for monitoring intermediated labor markets and the activities of single
intermediaries.
An efficient reallocation of labor is essential in order for the economy to be
productive, to allocate the available resources effectively, and to absorb local and
transitory shocks that affect sectors and industries selectively. An easy and smooth
reallocation process is fundamental for guaranteeing more rapid and less costly job
market transitions for workers, with immediate and long-lasting benefits for individ-
ual incomes. A decrease in the dimensions of the small world of labor mobility favors
the good functioning of a reallocation market.
When intermediation is allowed, policy interventions might be needed to ensure
that the sector remains competitive. Certain regulatory mechanisms should be devised
to prevent the market from becoming concentrated in a few intermediaries.
The trend we observed in the empirical distribution of hiring channels indicate that
TEA market shares might increase over time, leaving the market for hiring services
controlled by a few large intermediaries. Their dominant positions could be used to
exploit their informational advantage, to the detriment of their customers. This would
be harmful because of the high rents that the dominant TEAs could extract from their
activity, and because of the poor matching services firms and workers would likely
receive in a non-competitive intermediation market.
Theoretical insights from network formation provide compelling evidence for the
need for well-timed policy interventions. Once self-sustaining linkage mechanisms,
for example, preferential attachments, are set in motion, it is more difficult to inter-
vene in order to modify the underlying individual-level incentive structure. It is better
to rectify budding adverse market trends rather than to wait until they are fully
developed and widespread. Good market monitoring is essential to enable this.
Network-based methodologies for mapping labor markets, of the type we pro-
posed in this paper, could help policy makers in detecting early signs of mar-
ket concentration, and therefore could provide useful evidence-based input about
whether and how to control the activities of intermediaries through appropriate reg-
ulatory measures or to foster competition through the setting up of efficient public
intermediaries.
As for the Italian case, currently debated, influential proposals of labor mar-
ket reform suggest a profound revision of employment protection mechanisms that
would imply a wider and more critical role for private intermediaries.10 In this light,
policy makers can, and perhaps should, be interested in having a better knowledge of
10 See, for instance, the legislative bills d.d.l. n. 1873 of 11 November 2009 and d.d.l. n. 555 of 18 April
2013, both signed first by Senator Pietro Ichino.
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the way in which intermediated labor markets actually work and how to effectively
monitor their functioning.
The set of methodologies presented in this paper nonetheless requires further
development. In particular, the trade off between the economic efficiency gained
from centralized brokerage, and the opportunity for monopolistic behavior of the top
TEAs deserves a separate and more sophisticated analysis that yields finer indications
about market evolution.
For instance, the time span after TEAs establishment should be expanded and
labor network evolution tracked beyond 2001, in order to demonstrate the exis-
tence/persistency/evolution of the observed trends. Moreover, complementary infor-
mation about the quality of matching through TEAs (e.g. duration of the new
job, wage progression, changes of occupation between old and new jobs, etc.)
and the mark ups charged by labor market intermediaries, in particular the biggest
ones, should be collected and analyzed in order to give further evidence of the
monopolistic/monopsonistic behavior of intermediaries.
Unfortunately, the VWH dataset alone does not provide the necessary information
to carry out such analyses and hence the answer should be based on other sources
or on merging several sources into one dataset. The present limitations would be
valuable topics for an exciting, future research on possible applications of network
methodologies to labor mobility, based on matched employer-employee data.
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Appendix I - The first phase of TEAs in Italy (1997–2001)
Private TEAs are a relatively new phenomenon in Italy. They were allowed to operate
by Legge (Law) no. 196 of 1997, the so called Treu reform of the labor market, and
the first TEAs were established between 1997 and 1998.11 The reform signalled the
end of the public monopoly on employment services and introduced a new type of
employment agreement, the “interinale”, a provisional contract allowing agencies to
11 The precise normative references is Legge 196/1997 (artt. 1-11), integrated by Decreto Ministero del
Lavoro 381/97 and 382/97, Circolare esplicativa Ministero del Lavoro 141/97, Decreto Ministero del
Lavoro 31/05/1999 and 29/11/1999, and modified by Legge 488/1999 and 388/2000. See also CCNL
“Imprese fornitrici di lavoro temporaneo” (National Labor Contract for the temporary employment sector)
of 1998.
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hire people in order to place them in client firms for a fixed period. Up to 2003, the
only type of contract available to Italian intermediaries was the interinale.12
The essential articulation of the Treu reform was conceived already in 1995 with
the declared aim of providing a solution to the high level of unemployment reg-
istered especially in the southern regions of the country and among young people
and that had been steadily growing during the early and mid-1990s following the
economic downturn of 1992.13 The bulk of interventions aimed at facilitating labor
market entry through the introduction of a more flexible and less costly fixed-term
contract, the interinale, and liberalizing labor intermediation. Before 1997, Italian
legislation prohibited the intermediation of subordinate labor, even when the ser-
vice was freely given, and inflicted heavy penalties for failure to comply with
the law.14
Fixed-term contracts signed by both parties without the intervention of an inter-
mediary were allowed in post-war Italy, and their use massively increased during the
1990s; in Veneto they represented 42 % of total engagements in the private sector in
2001 (the last year relevant for our analysis), corresponding to 6.2 % of employment
in terms of days worked (Veneto Lavoro 2008a, b). Nevertheless, in 2001, the share
of days worked based on open-ended contracts was 84 %, revealing a labor market
still dominated largely by arrangements characterized by high firing costs and tight
regulatory restrictions.15
Provisional contracts became much common immediately after their introduction,
generating 58,500 engagements in Veneto in 2001, corresponding to 11 % of total
engagements in the private sector, and 0.8 % of employment in terms of days worked.
Even in the northern regions of Italy, characterized by much lower unemployment
than southern regions, the interinale contract thus emerges as a practice widely used
by companies.16 TEAs operating in Veneto were only two in 1997, rising to 29 in
1998, 36 in 1999, 41 in 2000, and 51 in 2001.
The Italian Department of Labor (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali
2001) pointed out that the use of provisional contracts in practice responded to a vari-
ety of conditions that go far beyond what is needed for temporary working. Italian
employers often use provisional agreements to select candidates to fill posts, pend-
ing a permanent appointment. In contrast to other forms of fixed-term contracts this
allows the firms to access the search and screening services provided by TEAs, in
12 The relevant normative was modified in 2003 by D.lgs. 276/03, the so called Biagi reform, enlarging
the scope of labor market intermediation.
13 According to the Italian Statistical Institute (Istat), the overall unemployment rate at the national level
was 8.6 % in 1991, 11.2 % in 1995 and 11.2 in 1997; among people aged 15-24, these figures were,
respectively, 26.9 %, 29.9 % and 29.6 %. In the southern regions of Italy the overall unemployment rate
was 14.1 % in 1991, 18.2 % in 1995 and 19 % in 1997.
14 The normative references are: codice civile (Civil Code) art. 2127; Legge 264/49, and Legge 1369/60.
15 Towards the end of the 1990s, the Italian labor market was still governed by very strict employment
protection legislation for standard employment. In 1999, the OECD (1999) ranked Italy 23rd out of 27
countries for “overall strictness of protection against dismissals” (the lower the ranking the stricter the
regulation).
16 Brandt et al. (2005) report that Italy achieved the largest reduction in the OECD Employment Protection
Legislation sub-index for temporary employment since the mid-1990s, due to the Treu reform.
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order to identify the professional and individual profiles most appropriate for the
vacancies they want to fill.
In the first years of TEA activity, the importance of the screening motivation is
well illustrated by the high rate of transformation of provisional into permanent posi-
tions. A survey conducted by the Italian Department of Labor shows that in 2000 and
2001 roughly a quarter of provisional contracts developed into permanent appoint-
ments (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2001). Based on head counts
the percentage is higher, since the same individual might take up several separate
temporary positions with the same employer.
The role of TEAs in searching and screening is also revealed by the fact that firms
frequently request agencies to provide skilled workers with very specific profiles,
as reported by Iacus and Porro (2002). In the years immediately following the Treu
reform, only 50 % of provisional jobs in Veneto involved low-skilled workers, and
this percentage has decreased over time (Veneto Lavoro 2008b). More generally, the
literature has acknowledged how Italian TEAs have demonstrated their capacity to
supply a variety of worker profiles. They do not specialize solely in contracting the
archetypical young, male, low-skilled worker; they have on their books more mature
manual workers with particular skills, and young men and women with medium-high
educational qualifications, who usually seek employment in the service sector (Porro
et al. 2004).
The literature on the effects of the Treu reform has focused almost exclusively on
individual labor market outcomes that could be immediately related to the introduc-
tion of the interinale contract, and in particular on the stability of job relationships
of people who started working with interinale contracts. Conclusions are rather con-
trasting. While some authors argue that interinale jobs turn out to lead to prolonged
instability (Barbieri and Scherer 2009; Sciulli 2006), others claim that these contracts
constitutes effective springboards for more fluid careers (Ichino et al. 2005).
From a macroeconomic point of view, the Treu reform of the labor market is
descriptively associated with a significant reduction of unemployment rate both at
the national and regional level. According to Istat data, in the period 1997–2001 in
Veneto, unemployment decreased by one third, from 6.4 % to 4.5 %, to reach the
minimum of the decade in 2007 at 3.3 %.
Appendix II - Graph-theoretic definitions
This appendix provides the formal definitions of the graph-theoretic concepts used
in this study (Boccaletti et al. 2006). Let V = {i : 1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of firms
representing network vertices. For each ordered pair of firms (i, j), with i, j ∈ V
and i = j , let lij ∈ {0, 1} be a link pointing from i to j , with lij = 1 if a flow of
workers has passed from firm i to firm j (active link), and lij = 0 otherwise (inactive
link); let then L = {lij } be the collection of such links. The set of firms and the set
of links form the binary directed labor mobility network G(V , L). The total number
of vertices in a graph is n, the number of active links is m = ∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
lij ; the number
of active links divided by the maximum possible number of active links gives the
978 C. Gianelle
network density, denoted by δ(G) = m/n(n − 1). In the text, links refers to active
links only.
The number of links pointing towards i is defined as the in-degree of vertex i,
and is denoted by kini ; similarly, the number of links originating from iis defined as
the out-degree of vertex i, and it is denoted by kouti . The total-degree of vertex i,
indicated by ktoti , is the sum of in-degree and out-degree. In formal terms,
kini =
∑
j∈V
lji , (1a)
kouti =
∑
j∈V
lij , (1b)
ktotj = kini + kouti . (1c)
For the sake of simplicity, in the text degree refers to total-degree. The average
degree of a network is equal to the average degree of its vertices, denoted by k(G).
The highest degree vertices are referred to as hubs. If we think of the degree of
a vertex as the realization of a random variable K , the degree distribution is the
probability distribution of K , that is the probability that the degree of a vertex is
equal to k, and is indicated by p(k) = Pr(K = k). In directed networks there are
three different degree distributions for in-degree, out-degree, and total-degree. The
complementary cumulative degree distribution (CCDD) is denoted by P(k), and is
defined as P(k) = Pr(K ≥ k)
A path from vertex i to vertex j is said to exist if lij = 1 or if there is a set of
distinct intermediate vertices j1, j2, ..., jn such that lij1 = lj1j2 = . . . = ljnj = 1.
A network component is a set of vertices all of which are either mutually reachable
through paths, obtaining a strongly connected component, or one-way reachable only,
obtaining a weakly connected component. A network can consist of several compo-
nents, which can be ordered according to size, that is, the number of their vertices.
A network is said to have a giant component if the largest weakly connected compo-
nent covers at least 50 % of the vertices (nwcc ≥ n/2), the largest strongly connected
component covers at least 25 % of vertices (nscc ≥ n/4), and the other components
are small (typically of order ln(n)). Giant weakly/strongly connected components are
referred to as WCC and SCC, respectively.
The length of the path from i to j is equal to the number of links between iand j .
The shortest path between i and j is the geodesic, and its length is denoted by dij . The
average path length (APL) of a network is defined as the average of the geodesics
between all possible pairs of vertices in the SCC, and is denoted by d(G), yielding
d(G) =
∑
i∈SCC
∑
j∈SCC
dij
nSCC − 1 . (2)
The set of vertices with which vertex i is directly connected, on both entry and
exit, is called the (nearest) neighborhood of i, and is defined as Ni = {j ∈ V : lij =
1 ∨ lj i = 1}; the number of neighbor vertices of i is thus ηi = |Ni |. This notion
leads to the definition of the metric clustering coefficient. The clustering coefficient
of vertex i, denoted by Ci , measures the extent to which the neighbor vertices of i
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are linked to form a densely connected group. Following Watts and Strogatz (1998),
the clustering coefficient of vertex i is defined as the ratio of the actual number of
links between the neighbors of i and the maximum possible number of these links.
Denoting by u and v two generic neighbors of i, the following expression is obtained
Ci
∑
u∈Ni
∑
v∈Ni
luv
ηi(ηi − 1) , (3)
which takes values in the interval [0,1]. Vertices with ηi = 1 are assigned Ci = 0.
The average clustering coefficient of a network is indicated by C(G), and is referred
to with the acronym ACC.
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